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Abstract 
 
Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators, regulators, and courts, 
presumably to encourage favorable policies and/or outcomes. In dollar terms, corporate 
lobbying expenditures are typically one or even two orders of magnitude larger than spending 
by Political Action Committees (PAC), and unlike PAC donations, lobbying amounts are 
direct corporate expenditures. We use data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 
1995, to examine this more pervasive form of corporate political activity. We find that on 
average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial 
performance. These results are robust across a number of empirical specifications. We also 
report market performance evidence using a portfolio approach. We find that portfolios of 
firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks in the 
three years following portfolio formation. 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of corporate political activity in the United States is a hotly debated issue, 
especially since the 2010 Supreme Court Citizens United ruling, which relaxed constraints on 
corporate (and other groups’) spending on elections. Early studies of corporate political 
activity (e.g., Snyder, 1992) focused on whether political contributions affect legislative 
voting outcomes. Snyder concludes that “despite years of research by political scientists and 
economists, the extent to which money actually buys political influence on a regular basis 
remains a mystery.” More recently, studies have considered outcomes from the perspective of 
the firm, rather than political outcomes, in areas such as tax rates (Richter, Samphantharak, 
and Timmons, 2009), regulatory oversight (Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh, 2006; Lux, 
Crook, and Woehr, 2011), earmarks (De Figuerido and Silverman, 2006), tariffs (Mayda, 
Ludema, Mishra, 2010), and government contracts (Goldman, So, and Rocholl, 2012).1   
The goal of this study is to extend the analysis to overall corporate financial 
performance, and to focus the analysis on corporate spending (i.e., lobbying activities) as 
opposed to a more typical focus on contributions by Political Action Committees (PACs). 
Specifically, we attempt to estimate causal effects of corporate political activity on firms’ 
subsequent financial performance. By studying all firms for which we can get financial data, 
including those that are not politically active, we take advantage of the data’s panel structure, 
thereby allowing us to control for all time invariant firm-specific omitted variables when 
comparing firms that lobby with those which do not. Nichols (2007) and Angrist and Pischke 
(2009) advocate this as one way to address the bias due to unobserved confounders, common 
in studies relying on observational data. As a second identification strategy we use a matching 
technique to study the stock market performance of portfolios of lobbying and matched firms.  
As noted, most studies of corporate political activity examine spending by corporate 
affiliated Political Action Committees.  Miylo, Primo, and Groseclose (2000) explain the 
“inordinate attention to PAC contributions” by noting that “data on contributions are readily 
                                                 
1 Other recent studies of corporate political activity include: Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), Alexander, Scholz, 
and Mazza (2009), Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ueda (2004), Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010), de 
Figueiredo and Tiller (2001), Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007), Fisman (2001), Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009), 
Hill, Kelly, and Van Ness (2013), Hillman, Keim, and Schuler (2004), Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2009), Kim 
(2008), and Yu and Yu (2011). 
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available and PACs are easily linked to their corporate or industry sponsors”. Brasher and 
Lowery (2006) caution that such research is too “narrow”, and suggest that empirical findings 
concerning PAC behavior may not be generalizable; their study then argues that corporate 
lobbying is the more appropriate focus. The key distinction, according to Ansolabehere, de 
Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) is that since PAC dollars are actually contributions by 
individuals, and not corporations, PAC spending should not even be considered ‘corporate’.  
In contrast, lobbying is a corporate expense – presumably made with a view toward the firm’s 
bottom line. Given these critiques, this study focuses instead on the impact of corporate 
lobbying on subsequent corporate financial performance.  
Additional motivation for this study is provided by recent research into the financial 
implications of corporate connections with politicians. Generally, these studies conclude that 
connected firms receive specific benefits from political connections, and importantly, that the 
value of these connections is priced in financial markets.2 Recent studies find, for example, 
that political connections lead to better access to finance, and/or lower taxation, government 
bailouts, higher market returns, more government contracts, and greater market share, e.g., 
Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008), Faccio (2006), Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006), 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), and Goldman, So, and Rocholl (2012). 
Econometrically, we rely on the assumption that the impact of time-dependent omitted 
variables is minimal. This suggests that given the severity of the global financial crisis, the 
likelihood that firms made unique, one-off spending decisions, cannot be discounted. For this 
reason we mainly focus on lobbying during the pre-crisis years 1998-2005.3 We hand match 
lobbying data to financial data from Compustat, and to stock market returns and security 
pricing data from CRSP, for as many firms as have data available. We begin with the 
approach taken by researchers studying the value of corporate Research and Development 
(R&D) expenditures (e.g., Sougiannis, 1994; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996). We examine three 
accounting measures of performance released in firms’ financial statements: income before 
extraordinary items, net income, and operating cash flows. The evidence we present points to 
                                                 
2 These studies do not conclude that firms with political connections necessarily enjoy superior financial 
performance, e.g., Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007). 
3 Following the suggestion of a referee, we do examine one important out-of-sample event. Specifically, in 
Section 3.c we ask whether lobbying activity or market performance of firms engaged in lobbying activities 
changed relative to other firms in the time period following the U.S. Supreme Court Citizens United decision. 
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a robust, positive relationship between corporate lobbying expenditures and firm financial 
performance, though the results are weaker when focusing on cash flows from operations. In 
robustness exercises, we attempt to provide a more nuanced view by considering  non-
linearity in the relationship, and principal agent interpretations via sub-sample regressions 
(e.g., limiting to large lobbying spenders only, and to firms with weak investor protection 
only).  
In Section 3b, we abandon the panel approach and adopt a portfolio approach focusing 
on market returns. Specifically we compare excess returns of portfolios of matched lobbying 
and non-lobbying firms. We follow the portfolio approach used by Chan, Lakonishok, and 
Sougiannis (2001) who study the stock market valuation of R&D expenditures; hence both of 
our empirical approaches derive from studies of R&D. One important benefit of this portfolio-
based approach is that it mitigates concerns about reverse causality and endogeneity, since the 
focus of the analysis is on future (i.e., one-, two-, and three-year ahead) excess market returns. 
Forecasts of future market performance at these horizons are highly unreliable, thus making 
endogeneity bias and reverse causality arguments less credible. We find that lobbying is 
positively correlated with future excess returns. In particular, firms with the highest lobbying 
intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks. Our results also suggest that most 
lobbying expenditures are not associated with abnormal returns, and that simply spending the 
most on lobbying does not necessarily lead to better stock market returns. However, since our 
(indeed all) matching relies on observables we caution that the results are conditional on our 
matching procedures. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and how we 
arrive at our final sample. Section 3 develops our research design and presents the results of 
the analysis. Section 4 concludes.  
2. Data 
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 established the registration and reporting 
requirements for those who seek to affect U.S. government policies or the implementation of 
Federal programs. Registrants must file semi-annual reports (within 30 days of the end of the 
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semi-annual period) detailing the issue they lobby for and the amount spent.4 The Center for 
Responsive Politics (CRP) data includes lobbying, PAC contributions, and soft-money as 
distinct categories. It is compiled using the semi-annual lobbying disclosure reports filed with 
the Secretary of the Senate’s Office of Public Records and is available by calendar year since 
1998.  
The CRP sums the mid-year and year-end total amounts of expenses reported by a 
registrant to arrive at annual figures for each firm. Adjustments are made if there are any 
subsequent amendment reports correcting the originally reported amount in either the mid-
year or year-end filings. Lobbying can be done in-house, and/or via a contractual arrangement 
with external lobbyists to lobby on a firm’s behalf. These external lobbyists must report for 
whom they lobby. The CRP uses the amount reported by the organization (including both in-
house lobbying and external lobbyist filings) as the total lobbying expenditure for the period. 
Thus, even if an organization does not file for lobbying itself (e.g., because it has no in-house 
lobbying), the CRP sums all of the organization’s contracted lobbying expenditures reported 
by its external lobbyists. Finally, when a parent firm and its subsidiary both file for lobbying, 
the CRP attributes all lobbying expenses to the parent firm.5  
The CRP lobbying data include spending by publicly traded firms, privately held firms, 
trade associations, ideological organizations, and non-profit organizations. We merged the 
data with Compustat to extract only public firms. Since CRP does not use company identifiers 
(e.g., CUSIP, PERMNO, etc.), we manually verified the names of the public firms to ensure 
the matching between Compustat and CRP lobbying data.  
Table I compares the three categories of corporate political involvement for firms in 
Compustat that lobbied during the sample period. The relative magnitudes of lobbying, PAC 
contributions, and soft money donations are reported. Note that both PAC and soft money are 
reported by election cycle rather than calendar year. Perhaps surprising to many, lobbying is 
relatively uncommon, despite its being the predominant form of corporate political activity. 
At the beginning of our sample only 6.5% of the firms in Compustat lobbied, though that 
                                                 
4 Typically, issues are very general, e.g., “Lobby for business and workforce development programs and 
appropriations”. The CRP provides a considerable service by sifting, matching, and cleaning the raw lobbying 
disclosure data. To access the Senate lobby reports and registrations database, go to http://sopr.senate.gov.  
5 See http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/methodology.asp for more details about the CRP’s methodology. 
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number has been growing over time, reaching 11.8% of Compustat firms by the end of our 
sample. Nonetheless, media investigations often portray corporate lobbying activities in 
scandalous overtones.6 Also, it is clear that lobbying accounts for the lion’s share (in both 
dollar amounts and in the number of firms involved) among all types of corporate political 
expenditures.7 If we compare the average firm’s political spending across the three categories 
(by aggregating lobbying expenses per year into amounts per election cycle to match the 
reported PAC and soft money) in the 1998 election cycle, for instance, we see that lobbying is 
around 22 times greater than PAC contributions, and around 20 times greater than soft-money 
contributions.8 All three types of spending increase across the sample, though soft money is 
relatively constant in the final two election cycles of its existence (i.e., 2000 and 2002).  
Figures 1a and 1b present the aggregate, and average, annual lobbying expenditures of 
sample firms graphically. The figures confirm that much of the growth in lobbying 
expenditures is due to additional firms, since the per-firm average has been roughly constant 
at about $540,000, with the exception of the last two years of the sample where it increased by 
about $40,000. Table II lists the top twenty contributors in 2005. Indeed, these firms are often 
large and the amounts they spend on lobbying are impressive, with General Electric spending 
close to $19 million in 2005 alone.9 These aspects of corporate lobbying (i.e., few, and 
generally larger, firms lobbying persistently) suggest caution in overstating estimated impacts 
for firms not already lobbying. 
In Table III, we look across industry group and year. Firms in manufacturing (two-
                                                 
6 News accounts citing lobbying financial benefits include The Washington Post (2006) reporting that 60 
companies (including Pfizer, Hewlett Packard and Altria) collectively spent approximately $1.6 million dollars 
lobbying for a special low tax rate worth $100 billion dollars, which would apply to the firms’ earnings from 
foreign operations. The same article quoted the case of Carmen Group Inc., a lobbying services firm claiming to 
deliver a 100 to 1 (dollar) benefit-to-cost ratio for its clients. Similarly, Fortune (2006) estimated similarly large 
rates of return on political investment: 163,536% for Lockheed Martin, which spent $55 million in lobbying 
since 1999 and won roughly $90 billion in defense contracts; and 142,000% for Boeing, which spent $57 million 
and got $81 billion in contracts. 
7 If we restrict the sample to only those firms engaged in all three forms of political involvement, the number of 
firms falls below 200 (or roughly one-third of the full sample), and the resulting sample spends on average 
nearly three times more on lobbying than in the full sample. In our regression analysis we do not restrict the 
sample to just these firms. 
8 Total lobbying spending of our sample firms in the 1998 election cycle is $789,391,490 
(=704*$554,628+765*521,482) and the amount of PAC contributions is $36,385,753 (=430*$84,618). 
9 In their study on the determinants of lobbying, Kerr, Lincoln, and Mishra (2011) note also that lobbying is 
strongly related to firm size and is highly persistent. These authors conclude that the existence of substantial 
entry costs can explain why so few firms lobby, its relation to firm size, as well as lobbying’s persistence. 
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digit SIC=20-39), transportation and utilities (two-digit SIC=40-49), and finance, insurance 
and real estate industries (two-digit SIC=60-69) are more active in lobbying activities than are 
other firms, evident by the average lobbying spending. The public administration industry 
(two-digit SIC=90-99) has the highest average lobby spending among all the industry groups, 
however, there are relatively few firms in public administration involved in lobbying in most 
years, and most of these firms are conglomerates. These differences suggest to us the 
importance of controlling for industry effects in our analysis.  
To ensure that the lobbying data and financial data correspond to the same time period, 
we focus our analysis on firms with fiscal year ending December 31. Our sample of lobbying 
firms is reduced to just below 7000 firms due to the elimination of firms with non-calendar 
fiscal year end.  
Panels A and B of Table IV report descriptive statistics for the various measures of 
accounting performance, lobbying, and other independent variables used in our analysis. 
Panel A focuses on firms that lobby, and Panel B reports data for all firms in Compustat. The 
most obvious conclusion from comparing Panel A with Panel B is that firms with non-zero 
lobbying spending are, on average, substantially larger.  
3. Research Design and Results 
The theoretical basis for this study originates in research into the political economy of 
business and regulation such as Stigler (1971). In Stigler’s view the State, through its power 
to tax, subsidize, and regulate, can selectively help or hurt particular firms or industries. He 
discusses several specific forms of government influence, including: subsidies and earmarks 
(e.g., veterans, airlines, and universities); control over entry or rivals (e.g., commercial airline 
authority, and, entry into banking); and import tariffs. According to Stigler, lobbying can 
generate positive returns for firms by any one (or a combination) of several means: securing 
direct subsidies or lower taxes, getting government contracts, limiting competition, or 
permitting entry into previously protected markets. In addition to Stigler (1971), there are 
other explanations for the role of lobbying. For example, Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001) 
view lobbying as a means for interest groups to communicate with policy-makers and inform 
them with local knowledge. Gordon and Hafer (2005) propose that lobbying is a costly signal 
sent by interest groups, and conveys a credible threat to the regulators of the interest groups’ 
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willingness to fight. Both alternative theories imply an empirical prediction of a positive 
association between lobbying and financial performance.  
Empirically, our primary difficulty in estimating causal effects using non-experimental 
observational data is self-selection, which arises from endogeneity. As stressed by Nichols 
(2007) and Angrist and Pischke (2009), such data present researchers with serious challenges 
since the treatment variables (e.g., lobbying) are not randomly assigned. That is, some firms 
lobby while others abstain – based on circumstances peculiar to the firm itself. For example, 
firms (but not the econometrician) may have reason to believe (e.g., through a personal 
connection) that lobbying will be successful (or unsuccessful) in say, yielding a government 
contract. Hence, an inference that an OLS estimated coefficient reflects the impact of 
lobbying on any firm’s financial performance may be misleading. Absent an instrumental 
variable that affects lobbying but not firm financial performance, or a suitable assignment 
variable for use in a regression discontinuity design, we focus on panel and matching methods 
to control for omitted variable bias. We also provide some sensitivity analyses in an attempt 
to mitigate concerns that the results are dependent on particular functional forms or samples. 
In our context, the key benefit to using panel methods is in using firm i as its own 
control group. Hence, the identification requirement here is that omitted confounding 
variables are time invariant. This is an important assumption but we believe it is reasonable in 
our context for several reasons. First, firms tend to lobby for specific pending legislation and 
court cases which from the firm’s perspective arise more or less randomly.10 Some examples 
from recent studies seem to corroborate this notion. First, Alexander, Scholz, and Mazza 
(2009) find that the tax holiday created by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 led to a 
surge in lobbying and an estimated one-time 22,000% return. Richter, Samphantharak, and 
Timmons (2009) report that Bartlett and Steele (1988) identify “650 special tax emptions for 
specific firms or individuals” within the 1986 Tax Reform Act alone. More recent examples 
include the lobbying subsequent to the 2009 Stimulus Act (e.g., Igan, Mishra, and Tressel 
2009; Adelino and Dinc 2013). These more or less random opportunities lend some support to 
our fixed effects estimation strategy. However, clearly as the scope of firms’ activity broadens, 
                                                 
10 Here too, contributions (which tend to rise and fall with election cycles) differ from lobbying; making the 
fixed effects framework less plausible when studying contribution (e.g., PAC) data. 
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there will be more ‘random’ opportunities; this makes our robustness exercises focusing on 
different sizes of firms even more salient.  
As a further precaution against time dependent omitted confounding variables, we 
focus on the pre-crisis (2007-present) time period. Several recent papers have used the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), or the Citizens United case, as ‘natural experiments’ (e.g., Werner 
2011, and Coates 2012). Given the magnitude and scope of the GFC it seems highly dubious 
to treat omitted confounding variables invariant over this time period. That said, we recognize 
that even within our sample period, our results will still be biased if lobbying expenditures are 
correlated with time-varying omitted variables. We attempt to control for firm specific trends 
using lags of the dependent variable as described below. 
3.a  Financial statement evidence 
To guide our empirical specifications, we draw from studies investigating the impact 
of R&D expenditures on financial performance. Conceptually, lobbying is similar to R&D in 
that each is undertaken voluntarily by (not all) individual firms, and yields uncertain future 
payoffs. Although lobbying (and R&D) charges are incurred in a specific time period, the 
implications for performance may only be in subsequent years. In Table V we examine three 
standard measures of firm performance taken from firms’ financial statements, and we present 
three econometric specifications for each measure since theory does not pin down the speed 
with which lobbying affects firm performance, for a total of nine regressions; t-statistics for 
coefficient estimates computed using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that are 
clustered at the firm level (Moulton 1986) are reported in parentheses.11 Our three 
econometric specifications parallel those developed in Sougiannis (1994), Amir and Lev 
(1996), and Lev and Sougiannis (1996).  
One critique that is immediately apparent concerns the direction of causality, i.e., does 
lobbying influence financial performance or the reverse? Hence in Appendix Table 2 we 
present the reverse regressions for each of our three measures of financial performance. 
Consistent with the theory and prior research, these specifications point toward lobbying 
                                                 
11 Table V includes all firms for which we have data. Firms in Banking and Finance firms are often treated as a 
special category given that EBIT and cash flows have a slightly different meaning, and they tend to be more 
highly leveraged. Hence, regressions excluding firms in Banking and Finance are reported in Appendix 1. Since 
the results are quite similar, we include all firms in the remaining analysis, except where noted. 
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impacting financial performance as the primary channel. 
According to Table V, in columns (1) - (3), we present results for income before 
extraordinary items (IBEI) as the measure of financial performance. We choose income before 
extraordinary items instead of other earnings measures, such as income before interest, 
income tax, and depreciation and amortization, because lobbying activities may affect 
lobbying firms’ effective tax rates and interest rates. In columns (4) - (6), we repeat the 
analysis using net income (NI), and in columns (7) - (9), we use cash from operations (CFO), 
as alternative financial performance measures. The general specification we study is:12  
Financial Performanceit = ߚ	LOBBYi,t-1 + α1MBi,t + α2 ASSETi,t  
 + 
k
k  Financial Performancei,t-k  +
t
t Yeart  (1a) 
 +
j
j Industryj +
i
i Firmi + εijt, 
Firms that do not lobby are assigned a zero for the value of their lobbying expenses. 
ASSETi,t is the amount of total assets of firm i at the beginning of year t; and Firm, Year, and 
Industry are firm, year, and Fama-French (Fama and French, 1997) industry dummies 
respectively. To control for firm specific drivers of financial performance, we include the 
firm’s market-to-book ratio (MB), size (ASSET), and (up to) two previous year’s financial 
performance to control for within-firm trends. Note that the fixed effects estimator is actually 
an estimation in deviations from means; hence the strategy punts on comparisons in levels 
while requiring the counterfactual trend behavior of lobbying and non-lobbying firms to be 
the same (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
Admittedly, this specification reflects a lot of ignorance regarding financial 
performance since dummy variables absorb a wealth of potentially interesting variation of 
interest to many researchers. However for our purposes, this ‘generality’ is incidental since 
we care only about the impact of lobbying on financial performance. Results from estimation 
of equation (1a) are given in Table V. Given that theory does not pin down specific lag 
lengths, we provide three specifications for each financial performance measure to mitigate 
potential problems from serial correlation, where we vary the number of lags of the dependent 
                                                 
12 Scaling LOBBY by assets or sales produce qualitatively similar results. Similarly, scaling both LOBBY and the 
dependent variables by assets or by sales produces qualitatively similar results.  
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variable and of lobbying across the specifications.  
In additional (though not reported) robustness specifications we included three lags of 
the dependent variable. These produce similar results, though with a smaller sample size. 
Similarly, to mitigate the impact of outliers, we repeated these regressions excluding 
observations in the top and bottom 1 percent of the dependent variable. Again, the results are 
substantially unaffected. Finally, we re-estimated the models allowing for cross-sectional (as 
well as heteroskedasticity and within firm autocorrelation) using the Driscoll-Kraay estimator. 
Our results again were substantially unaffected.  
In Table V, focusing on IBEI, in columns 1 – 3, we see that lobbying is positively 
related to financial performance. The amount of variation explained (as given by the R2 
statistics) jumps substantially when we include a lagged dependent variable, but lobbying 
remains strongly statistically significant except for regressions focusing on cash from 
operations. This result is similar to that found by Hill, Kelly, and Van Ness (2013), which 
they interpret as indicating that lobbying (unlike corporate contributions) is driven by a profit 
maximization motive as opposed to agency motives, whereby the firm’s managers lobby as a 
means of enhancing personal, as opposed to corporate, objectives.  The coefficients on the 
lags of the dependent variable are generally statistically significant in each regression, 
implying persistence in these reported accounting measures of financial performance. The 
coefficient on the level of assets is statistically significant in all specifications suggesting that 
size effects are indeed important; however, the market-to-book ratio is never statistically 
significant.  
The specifications given in Table V posit a relationship between this year’s financial 
performance and last year’s lobbying efforts; however, theory is not precise about the exact 
timing for the effects. Hence, we explore additional possible lag specifications in Appendix 
Tables 3-5.  Specifically, we test for a contemporaneous link in Appendix Table 3, and then 
progressively add lags in Appendix Tables 4 and 5. Results from these specifications continue 
to indicate a statistically significant relationship between lobbying and firm financial 
performance; the contemporaneous relationship is slightly weaker, and often disappears when 
the specification includes lags of the dependent variable and lags of lobbying consistent with 
an impact that is not fully realized in the current period. Again, results focusing on cash from 
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operations (CFO) are weakest.  
The magnitude of the coefficient estimates given in Table V or Appendix Tables 3-5 
are large; on the surface they suggest that firms spending an additional 1 million dollars will 
see their financial performance jump by 50 to 80 times this amount. Even absent entry of new, 
non-lobbying firms, these returns should attract additional lobbying by firms already engaged 
in lobbying. Hence, we caution against concluding in favor of such outsized returns for 
several reasons. First, as suggested by Tables IV and V, lobbying is concentrated among large 
firms. Indeed, firms that lobby are roughly four times larger (by assets) than firms with zero 
lobbying expenditures. This may reflect the fact that large firms are more diversified, and 
more diversified firms are more likely impacted by more potential legislation, regulation, and 
court cases. Given the costs of maintaining relations with government officials over time, it 
may simply not be feasible for smaller firms to lobby (Olson, 1965). Moreover, as Adelino 
and Dinc (2013) note, these calculations ignore the opportunity cost of lobbying resources 
such as CEO time. Clearly there must be costs beyond simply the reported lobbying 
expenditures; recognizing these costs would lower the return to lobbying. 
That said, lobbying may in fact yield windfalls to firms in a position to take advantage 
of the time-sensitive nature of a particular piece of legislation, e.g., an economic stimulus bill. 
That is, many firms simply may not have the necessary connections, lobbying capability, or 
scope of operations at the time stimulus bills are being discussed. In other words, lobbying 
may be ‘lumpy’. To take an extreme example, spending lobbying dollars during periods when 
Congress is in recess might be pointless.  Hence, the large coefficients only makes it appear 
that more lobbying will yield more returns. While we recognize these limitations, we follow 
the advice of Angrist and Pischke (2009) and check the robustness of our results using 
alternative identification assumptions and models.  We consider an alternative specification of 
the basic panel estimation before turning to a portfolio estimation based on a matching 
strategy. 
In Table VI we present results from a closely related specification focusing on changes 
in the dependent variable (financial performance). This specification is given as equation (1b): 
∆Financial Performanceit = ߚ	LOBBYi,t-1 + α1MBi,t + α2 ASSETi,t 
12 
 
 + 
k
k ΔFinancial Performancei,t-k  +
t
t Yeart  (1b) 
 +
j
j Industryj +
i
i Firmi + εijt, 
In equation (1b) “∆” indicates the change from year t-1 to year t. LOBBYi,t-1 is the 
dollar amount of lobbying spending by firm i, in year t-1. In general, our results are robust 
across these several different specifications. Results presented in Table VI generally indicate a 
smaller effect of lobbying on the change in financial performance, and are cumulatively larger 
when the specification includes one lag of the dependent variable, but often become 
statistically weaker when the specification includes two lags of the dependent variable. The 
results support a positive relationship between lobbying and changes in financial performance 
(with caveats). 
One drawback to the analysis so far is the assumed linear relationship. In particular, 
there may be threshold effects, whereby the relationship changes when lobbying expenditures 
become very large. To check for this sort of nonlinearity, we repeat these regressions focusing 
on the highest quartile of lobbying firms. The question is whether the positive association is 
being driven only by the firms that spend the most on lobbying. These results (Appendix 
Table 6) are quite similar to those presented in Table V. Hence, the positive association 
between lobbying and firm performance does not seem any more or less prevalent for the 
firms with the largest lobbying expenses.  
There are several additional concerns that should be addressed before going further. 
These concerns make the interpretation of the positive regression coefficients difficult, in that 
the coefficient on lobbying may be proxying for something else. We discuss each of these in 
turn. First, lobbying could be correlated with an unobserved variable, e.g., government 
connections, which may be the real source of value to the firm. Should this be the case, the 
firm would lobby for issues or legislation the connected politician supports, in return for 
political favors. As a result, both the firm and the government official benefit from the 
lobbying activity, but the government connection is the true underlying cause. Unfortunately, 
we have no way to address this identification issue, since to do so we would need – at the 
least – to be able to identify a substantial subset of all firm/politician connections, which is 
beyond the scope of the present paper. However, since we cannot rule out additional political 
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connections, the possibility remains that lobbying is picking up some unobserved source for 
the observed positive effect.  
A second concern is that there could be an agency problem whereby managers having 
relatively high discretion tend to lobby most.13 In particular, the reported relationship might 
be masking the underlying relationship between managerial discretion and expected future 
firm performance. Specifically, managers with relatively high discretion over the decision to 
lobby may increase lobbying spending whenever they expect firm performance to be good. 
This alternative hypothesis implies that lobbying does not add value to the firm. Hence, we 
should observe a weaker relationship between lobbying and firm performance, or, even a 
reversal in the estimated coefficient for firms with weaker corporate governance 
characteristics.  
To investigate this possibility we examine two widely used measures of corporate 
governance. The first measure, used by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), attempts to 
measure shareholder rights across a large cross-section of U.S. firms. The second measure, 
produced by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel (2009), is designed to measure manager 
entrenchment comparatively over a similarly broad set of U.S. corporations. Bebchuk et al. 
(2009) propose their “E-index” measure as an improvement over that proposed by Gompers et 
al. (2003). Both measures use underlying data from the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center. As a start, we first check the simple correlation of lobbying expenditures with these 
two measures. Empirically, the correlation coefficient is below 0.20 for our sample of firms 
and years. Hence, a priori, there seems little to suggest that our results depend on corporate 
governance characteristics. However, we still test the agency hypothesis directly by 
comparing the relations between lobbying and financial performance in the context of our 
regression framework.  
Appendix Table 7 presents the results using the E-index measure developed in 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel (2009).14 As in the case of firms with the largest lobbying 
expenditures, we repeat our regression analysis by focusing on firms with the weakest 
investor protection, i.e., those with an E-index in the top quartile. As can be seen from the 
                                                 
13 For example, Ansolabehere et al. (2003) suggest managers could engage firms in political activities for their 
own personal political or ideological agenda. 
14 Their data is available at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml   
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table, the results are generally consistent with Table V across all nine specifications, though 
coefficients on lobbying rise among these firms suggesting a stronger impact of lobbying 
among poorly governed firms. All other coefficients are of similar magnitudes and 
significance levels.  Thus the results suggest that lobbying undertaken by firms with weak 
investor protection benefit more than other firms – though there is nothing to suggest 
managers of such firms use their discretion inappropriately.  
The natural question arises as to why the apparent gains have not been bid to zero via 
additional lobbying. First, recall that Kerr, Lincoln, and Mishra (2011) conclude that there are 
substantial entry costs to lobbying, i.e., firms must effectively sign on to a multiple-year 
contract, and their competitors in lobbying are large firms that have been lobbying (and 
relationship building) for some time. Unfortunately, these features of lobbying are very hard 
to test.  Consistent with these features, Wirl (1994) concludes, based on a dynamic model of 
lobbying that in equilibrium, there will be an apparent under-investment in lobbying, due to 
potential retaliation. For example, an implicit threat by a dominant firm to raise lobbying 
expenditures to very high levels would discourage other firms from engaging in lobbying. 
Gordon and Hafer (2005) demonstrate that lobbying can be used as a credible threat by 
interest groups to regulators, showing that they are willing to fight against any potential 
unfavorable policy. This signal effect of lobbying also can explain why there are not more 
firms engaged in lobbying. Thus our results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of 
Wirl (1994), as well as Gordon and Hafer (2005). That said, we caution that our reported 
average effect may not apply equally to all firms out of sample – given the time, industry, and 
issue specific nature of lobbying.  
To summarize, our results in Table VI are consistent with those presented in Table V, 
and point to a significant and positive association between lobby spending and future financial 
performance as measured by accounting data reported in firms’ financial reports. In the next 
section we turn to market based evidence. That is, we ask whether this positive association is 
present in market-adjusted returns by comparing portfolios of lobbying and non-lobbying 
firms. This approach also lets us examine the cross-section of firms with non-zero lobbying 
expenses further by explicitly comparing them with portfolios of matched non-lobbying firms.  
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3.b   Market return evidence 
Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) investigate whether stock prices fully value 
firms’ research and development (R&D) activities.  Many studies treat lobbying expenditures 
similar to R&D since both are thought to yield a future (uncertain) return (i.e., an investment) 
and yet they are both expensed in the current period.  Given that in an efficient market, stock 
prices reflect the value of firms’ intangible assets, there should be no association between 
lobbying and future stock returns. However, unlike R&D, access to data on what firms spend 
on lobbying has not generally been easily available, which would make valuation difficult. 
The problem goes both ways: i.e., not only might the market undervalue corporate lobbying 
activities due to ignorance, sensational news stories suggest valuations may be way too low 
for firms that lobby. To our knowledge, there has been no systematic study of the returns on 
shares of firms that lobby versus firms with no lobbying.  
Thus, this section examines whether lobbying activity is associated with future stock 
returns and whether the stock market correctly anticipates the expected future benefits of 
lobbying spending. This section extends the analysis of previous sections which focused on 
reported returns in financial statements, to consider whether the stock market values lobbying 
activities. We follow Chan et al. (2001) and implement a characteristic-based matching 
investment strategy (also known as the buy-and-hold abnormal returns approach); specifically, 
we check whether lobbying is related to future stock returns and whether firms engaging in 
lobbying activities financially outperform those do not. For these tests we (again following 
Chan et al., 2001) construct two measures of lobbying intensity: (a) lobbying expenditures 
relative to assets, and (b) lobbying expenditures relative to market value.  
We include all common stocks listed on the NYSE and Amex, as well as those listed 
on Nasdaq in our sample. Portfolios are formed at the end of March each year, allowing three-
month’s time between the end of a firm’s fiscal year and the public disclosure of its lobbying 
activities for the market to react to the information.15 Stocks of firms that lobby are assigned 
to one of five portfolios based on their ranked lobbying intensity. We keep stocks of non-
lobbying firms in a separate category for comparison.  
                                                 
15 The mandatory corporate filings are disclosed on the Senate website, generally within two months of filing, 
see http://www.senate.gov/legislative/Public_Disclosure/database_download.htm 
16 
 
We then calculate each portfolio’s average annual buy-and-hold return over each year 
from one to three years after portfolio formation. We use buy-and-hold return instead of 
periodic (monthly) rebalancing because it better resembles investors’ actual investment 
pattern.  We also calculate each portfolio’s average annual buy-and-hold return in excess of 
the equally weighted return16 on a control portfolio of stocks with zero lobby spending 
matched by firm size and book-to-market in the first through third post-formation years. 
There are six ranks by size and five ranks by book-to-market ratio resulting in 30 control 
portfolios. The ranking by book-to-market is based on quintile breakpoints over all stocks, 
and the size rankings are based on six quantiles of market capitalization. Each stock's return is 
measured net of the buy and-hold return on its control portfolio of firms that do not lobby. An 
implicit assumption of this matching approach is that, absent lobbying, the expected returns of 
firms that lobby and those in the respective control portfolios are similar. Hence, to the extent 
there are other omitted systematic determinants of expected returns, our results may need to 
be qualified.   
Table VII reports the returns and characteristics of portfolios classified by lobbying 
expenditure relative to assets.  As shown in Panel C of Table VII, both book-to-market and 
sales-to-market ratios of the firms that lobby are lower than non-lobbying firms. This could 
indicate that firms that lobby have relatively high intangible assets that do not appear on their 
balance sheets, or that such firms are star performers. The earnings-to-price ratio, dividend 
yield and return on equity of lobbying and non-lobbying groups are not significantly different 
from each other. Also, note that firms that lobby tend to be much bigger than non-lobbying 
firms, consistent with Olson (1965).  
Panel A of Table VII reports the raw returns before and after portfolio formation and 
Panel B reports excess returns are calculated after controlling for firm characteristics such as 
size and book-to-market ratio.  It appears that only firms in the highest lobbying intensity 
quintile (group 5) consistently outperform non-lobbying firms once we focus on excess 
returns.  The excess returns for the highest lobbying intensity portfolio appear substantial. For 
instance, the average annual return over three-year period after portfolio formation for the 
                                                 
16 For robustness checks, we also construct value-weighted returns on the control portfolio and the results remain 
little changed.  
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highest ranked portfolio is 5.5 percent per year, with the highest return in the first year 
following portfolio formation.  The difference in the mean excess returns between the highest 
ranked lobbying intensity quintile and non-lobbying group is statistically significant at the 1% 
level (two-tailed t test = 3.44).  
These results suggest that the stock market does not initially fully incorporate the 
value of corporate lobbying activities.  If the stock price fully captures the value of a firm’s 
lobbying activities, we would not find an association between lobbying intensity and future 
stock returns. The results also lessen the plausibility of causality running from performance to 
lobbying given that reverse causality would imply that managers accurately forecast 
profitability (excess market returns) three years into the future. 
Table VIII repeats this analysis for portfolios sorted by lobbying expenditures relative 
to market value of equity.17 Results here are similar, though with some nuances; particularly 
for those firms with the highest lobbying intensity. Over the three years prior to portfolio 
formation, the average raw annual return of stocks ranked in the top quintile by lobbying 
relative to market is the lowest (13.91 percent, panel A) across the other four lobbying 
portfolios. In comparison, stocks of firms that do no lobbying have an average return over the 
same period of 22.54 percent per year. The earnings of stocks in quintile 5 are also the lowest 
in the table (Panel C). However, the stocks in the top quintile portfolio perform well in the 
years following portfolio formation. These firms earn a 35.90 percent average raw return in 
the first subsequent year, compared to 29.70 percent for stocks with no lobbying, and the 
difference is more noticeable when comparing excess returns. This indicates possible 
underpricing of actively lobbying firms. In other words, the market may fail to give enough 
credit to past losers that are investing heavily in corporate lobbying.  The average annual 
excess rate of return over the three years following portfolio formation is 6.74 percent for the 
top lobbying quintile, while the non-lobbying firms earn essentially zero average excess 
returns. The difference in the mean excess returns between the two extreme groups is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (two-tailed t test = 4.04). This rebound effect is 
something also noted by Chan et al. (2001) for high R&D firms.  
                                                 
17 We also examined the stock returns for portfolios sorted by lobbying expenditures relative to sales. Overall, 
the results support our findings in Tables VII and VIII and again reveal an association between lobbying 
intensity and future stock returns. 
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We investigate this rebound effect further in Table IX, using a two-way sort (first by 
lobbying intensity, then by past returns) to capture the influence of both past returns and 
lobbying intensity (measured relative to assets). Specifically, we examine whether past losers 
who spend heavily on lobbying tend to be undervalued. Within each of the portfolios sorted 
by lobbying intensity, we assign a stock to one of two equally sized groups, based on its rate 
of return over the three years prior to portfolio formation. Each stock's return is measured net 
of the return on a control portfolio matched on size, book-to-market, as well as its past three-
year return. The table reports equally weighted excess returns on each portfolio. Within each 
quintile by lobbying expenditures relative to assets except for groups 2 and 4, past losers 
experience higher excess return in the first year post portfolio formation than past winners. 
However, the results become weaker in the three-year post portfolio formation period where 
only past losers in groups 2 and 3 outperform past winners. Overall, the results provide 
evidence of market mispricing of lobbying activities.  
3.c   Post-Sample Analysis: Citizens United 
In this section we examine whether the market returns of lobbying firms relative to 
firms without lobbying expenses differed significantly following the landmark U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in the Citizens United case.18 So far we have argued that including the Global 
Financial Crisis and beyond may require arguably less defensible additional econometric 
assumptions regarding the stability of the data generation process; hence up to now we have 
focused on the pre-crisis time period. However, given that the Citizens United decision was 
widely regarded as unexpected as well as controversial, a closer look at its effects seems 
warranted. Specifically, in this section we ask whether it is possible to discern a change in the 
relative financial performance of lobbying firms (measured by market returns) around the 
time of the Citizens United decision using a differences-in-differences econometric 
framework.19 
                                                 
18 Briefly, the Citizens United Supreme Court decision ruled that the U.S. federal government’s prohibition on 
direct corporate spending for advocacy violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The decision left 
in place existing bans against corporate and union donations to candidates or political parties (so-called ‘soft’ 
donations’). 
19 Some admittedly simplistic evidence against a large (positive) impact of the Citizens United decision on 
lobbying activity is that (a) the total amounts spent on lobbying peaked in 2009, or 2010, and (b) the number of 
lobbyists peaked even earlier (in 2007), and both have been trending downward since then (see 
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/). 
19 
 
It seems safe to say that the Citizens United decision has led to a cottage-industry of 
legal scholarship on its effects. However, interestingly, Werner (2011) is the only study we 
are aware of which attempts to evaluate the market (i.e., stock market) reaction to the decision. 
Werner (2010, p. 124) summarizes the possibilities: “the decision could be viewed as a boon 
to corporations (the popular view), the decision could serve as an inconvenient drain on 
corporate coffers (the contrarian view), or the decision simply could have no effect…”, and he 
adopts an event study methodology to examine how the market interpreted the decision. 
Werner’s sample differs from ours in that he selects 448 firms from the Fortune 500 (based 
on data availability and a desire to exclude firms with known confounding announcements), 
whereas our sample includes all firms. More importantly, Werner focuses his event study on 
abnormal returns, i.e., his null hypothesis is that lobbying firms outperform the market 
subsequent to the Citizens United decision. However, a moment’s reflection suggests that 
since lobbying firms account for 358 out of his total sample of 448 firms (i.e., 80%), they 
effectively are the market; thus his research design biases against finding statistical 
differences. Perhaps not surprisingly, Werner (2010) finds no impact of the Citizens United 
decision. 
Given these considerations, our approach here is to compare (raw) returns of lobbying 
firms to firms that do not lobby, in the periods immediately before and after the Citizens 
United decision, i.e., we employ a difference-in-differences identification strategy.20 We 
updated our sample of lobbying data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), and we 
collected stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). For 
completeness we consider three estimation windows surrounding the Citizens United decision 
(3 months, 2 months, and 1 month), and two post-Citizens United holding periods (1 day and 
1 week), and we defined ‘lobbying’ firms in two ways: (a) those that lobbied in 2009, or (b) 
those that lobbied in three out of the five years prior to the Citizens United decision. In 
particular, we estimate the following regression, and present the results in Table X: 
ܴ݁ݐ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵlobby +	ߚଶ݈݋ܾܾݕ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ	ܥ݅ݐ݅ݖ݁݊ݏ	ܷ݊݅ݐ݁݀ ൅ ߛܲ݋ݏݐ	ܥ݅ݐ݅ݖ݁݊ݏ	ܷ݊݅ݐ݁݀ +	ߝ௜௧ 
Variable definitions are as follows: Retit = daily returns from CRSP; α = an intercept; lobby = 
                                                 
20 Again, we thank a referee for suggesting this approach. 
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a dummy variable indicating firms with non-zero lobbying expenditures; Post Citizens United 
=  a dummy variable taking the value 0 in the time periods prior to January 21, 2010, and 1 
from January 22, 2010 on; lobby*Post Citizens United = an interaction dummy.   
We are most interested on the estimated coefficient on this interaction (β2), since 
statistical significance would indicate whether lobbying firms perform relatively better or 
worse subsequent to the Citizen United decision.  The evidence in Table X however, does not 
support an effect of firms that lobby relative to firms that do not in the post-Citizens United 
sample. Perhaps this should not come as a surprise. First, as Werner (2010) noted, firms may 
be reluctant to make dramatic changes to their lobbying in a new era of the ‘sky’s the limit’ 
lobbying. Alternately, the lack of a statistical significant difference between lobbying and 
non-lobbying firms may simply reflect that the Citizens United decision did not favor firms 
with prior lobbying efforts; it affects potential future entrants as well. 
4. Conclusions 
There is growing interest in the political activities of corporations. To date, the 
overwhelming focus of the financial press and research among academics is on corporate 
political contributions. Contributions however, account for only a small part of corporate 
political activities – which are not corporate expenses at all since they are, in fact, made by 
individuals. We document that lobbying expenses are by far the largest form of corporate 
political activity in the United States. Measured by number of firms engaged, or by dollar 
amounts spent, lobbying activities far outweigh corporate PAC or the (now banned) corporate 
soft-money donations. Moreover, this paper uses lobbying data that became publicly available 
after the passing of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to examine the financial 
implications of this dominant category of corporate political activity.  
We present several findings on the relation between corporate financial performance 
and lobbying. First, based on a pooled regression including all firms (i.e., those with zero and 
those with positive lobbying spending) we find evidence that lobbying expenditures are on 
average positively correlated with financial performance. We report several robustness and 
sensitivity analyses, including various measures of financial performance and alternative 
empirical specifications. Our results appear robust to several different empirical specifications, 
and several measures of financial performance, though they are weaker when focusing on 
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cash from operations.  
Some of the more interesting findings appear when we take a portfolio approach and 
consider stock market returns. Here, we compare the returns of firms that lobby based on their 
lobbying intensity, to the returns generated by portfolios of non-lobbying firms. We find that 
portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities outperform their benchmarks of non-
lobbying firms. We also show that increases in lobbying tend to follow poor performance, but 
what we observe is not simply a mean reversion in returns. Firms with the highest lobbying 
intensity outperform other firms with similar mean reversion in returns.  
Many articles in the financial press suggest that the returns to lobbying are large. 
Results here also indicate positive returns. As noted above, a natural follow-up question is 
what keeps even more firms from engaging in lobbying activities? Again, part of the answer 
may be that specific opportunities arise discretely, and for specific sectors; additional 
lobbying in unaffected sectors would be pointless. Also, as Kerr, Lincoln, and Mishra (2011) 
stress, the existence of substantial entry costs can restrict lobbying; this explanation cannot be 
ruled out and is consistent with our findings. Our portfolio results however, suggest a more 
nuanced answer: i.e., our analysis of firm-level lobbying data suggests that, in fact, most firms 
do not enjoy superior financial performance as a result of lobbying. Specifically, we find that 
only firms that have been willing to commit to the highest lobbying intensities have 
outperformed their peers. Firms in this category earned an excess return of 5.5% over the 
three years following portfolio formation, while the rest of the firms earned essentially a zero 
excess return. Clearly, not all firms can be in the top-intensity group. Additionally, the 
relative opacity of lobbying disclosures may have historically obscured its benefits, which 
suggests that going forward we should expect apparent rents to be dissipated via either greater 
lobbying spending among all participants, or by new entrants.  
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Figure 1: Total and Average Annual Lobbying Spending in the period of 1998-2005 
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Table I:    Three Categories of Corporate Political Involvement 
 
 
Panel A: Lobbying Activities (Annual amounts)    
Year # of firms Mean ($) 
Std Dev 
(million $)  Min ($)
Max 
(million $)
# of firms in 
Compustat  
% of firms in  
Compustat 
that lobby
1998 704 554,628 1.40 10,000 23 10765 6.54%
1999 765 521,482 1.23 10,000 14.7 10795 7.09%
2000 759 540,833 1.25 10,000 16 10347 7.34%
2001 796 539,003 1.24 10,000 15.4 9745 8.17%
2002 823 547,894 1.23 10,000 14 9292 8.86%
2003 925 549,761 1.28 10,000 17 9024 10.25%
2004 943 576,744 1.35 10,000 17.2 8716 10.82%
2005 963 581,447 1.41 10,000 18.8 8167 11.79%
     
Panel B: PAC Contributions (Election Cycle amounts)   
        
Year # of firms Mean ($) 
Std Dev 
(million $)  Min ($)
Max 
(million $)   
1998 430 84,618 0.14 350 1.5   
2000 487 94,036 0.16 125 1.8   
2002 509 106,190 0.18 200 1.6   
2004 527 127,146 0.22 150 2.1   
        
Panel C: Soft-Money Contributions (Election Cycle amounts)   
        
Year # of firms Mean ($) 
Std Dev 
(million $)  Min ($)
Max 
(million $)   
1998 324 116,607 0.21 250 2.4   
2000 420 197,834 0.34 220 2.4   
2002 423 195,574 0.38 250 2.9   
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Table II:    Top 20 Lobbying Spenders in 2005 (in $millions) 
 
Variable definitions: Assets = total assets; Sales = net sales; IBEI = income before extraordinary items; lobbying spending = lobbying expenditures. 
       Lobbying  
 Rank Company Name Industry Assets Sales IBEI Spending 
1 General Electric Conglomerates 673,342 148,019 18,275 18.77 
2 Altria Group Cigarettes 107,949 68,920 10,668 13.64 
3 Northrop Grumman Search, detection, navigation,  34214 30721 1383 13.60 
  guidance, aeronautical systems 
4 Southern Co Electric services 39,877 13,554 1,621 12.96 
5 Boeing Co Aircraft 60,058 54,845 2,562 9.24 
6 AIG  Life insurance 853,370 108,340 10,477 8.50 
7 General Motors Motor vehicles & car bodies 476,078 190,215 -10,458 7.76 
8 Motorola Inc Radio, TV broadcast,  35,649 36,843 4,599 7.59 
  communication equipment 
9 Lockheed Martin Guided missiles & space vehicles  27,744 37,213 1,825 7.34 
  & parts 
10 Exxon Mobil Petroleum refining 208,335 328,213 36,130 7.02 
11 Verizon Communications Telephone communications  168,130 75,112 7,397 6.76 
  except radiotelephone 
12 Pfizer Inc Pharmaceutical Preparations 117,565 51,298 8,094 6.49 
13 Amgen Inc Biological products except 29,297 12,430 3,674 5.72 
  diagnostic substances 
14 Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceutical Preparations 58,025 50,514 10,411 5.38 
15 DaimlerChrysler Motor vehicles & car bodies 238,773 177,365 3,376 5.34 
16 ConocoPhillips Petroleum refining 106,999 162,405 13,640 5.10 
17 Bristol-Myers Squibb Pharmaceutical 28,138 19,207 2,992 5.04 
18 GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceutical 46,748 37,855 8,059 4.86 
19 SBC Communications Telephone communications  145,632 43,862 4,786 4.84 
  except radiotelephone 
20 Ford Motor Co Motor vehicles & car bodies 269,476 177,089 2,228 4.80 
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Table III:    Average Lobby Spending by Industry Group and Year 
 
2-digit  
SICa Industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
 
01-09 Agriculture, 0.200 0.230 0.502 0.139 0.319 0.397 0.476 0.589 0.357 
 forestry & fishing (2)b (5) (3) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 
 
10-19 Mining & 0.410 0.403 0.420 0.329 0.376 0.253 0.284 0.269 0.343 
 construction (28) (30) (31) (33) (36) (45) (42) (43) (36) 
 
20-29 Manufacturing 0.725 0.765 0.693 0.657 0.738 0.656 0.671 0.744 0.706 
  (141) (147) (150) (152) (144) (163) (166) (175) (155) 
 
30-39 Manufacturing 0.628 0.530 0.548 0.528 0.484 0.480 0.494 0.481 0.522 
  (156) (164) (162) (175) (200) (226) (238) (234) (194) 
 
40-49 Transportation & 0.494 0.495 0.519 0.507 0.554 0.628 0.672 0.663 0.567 
 utilities (159) (166) (163) (167) (160) (158) (150) (150) (159) 
 
50-59 Wholesale & retail 0.215 0.208 0.235 0.487 0.242 0.297 0.293 0.301 0.285 
  (38) (40) (46) (42) (38) (42) (45) (51) (43) 
 
60-69 Finance, insurance 0.671 0.567 0.615 0.673 0.830 0.837 0.893 0.878 0.745 
 & real estate (91) (107) (100) (103) (103) (128) (125) (120) (110) 
 
70-79 Personal & 0.331 0.318 0.344 0.350 0.320 0.335 0.381 0.382 0.345 
 business services (54) (64) (70) (83) (90) (100) (107) (114) (85) 
 
80-89 Healthcare & 0.132 0.122 0.195 0.201 0.190 0.200 0.268 0.310 0.202 
 other services (29) (34) (27) (31) (40) (52) (57) (63) (42) 
 
90-99 Public 2.395 1.591 5.353 3.883 2.608 4.301 3.864 3.936 3.491 
 administration (3) (5) (3) (4) (5) (4) (5) (5) (4) 
 
This table reports data from the Center for Responsive Politics. The CRP data includes lobbying, PAC, 
and soft-money contributions as distinct categories. CRP reports lobbying expenses by calendar year 
and both PAC and soft-money contributions by election cycle 
 
aSIC classification is from the U.S. Department of Labor at http://www.osha.gov 
bNumber of firms is in parenthesis. 
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Table IV     Descriptive Statistics  
(Firms with fiscal years ending in December) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Firms with non-zero lobbying spending
IBEI 4,400 507.86 1,977.71 -25,779.47 36,130.00 
NI 4,400 501.72 2,014.38 -25,779.47 36,130.00 
CFO 4,272 1,111.21 3,500.09 -25,658.00 78,470.00 
ASSET 4,402 25,904.71 100,906.42 0.00 1,494,037.00 
LOBBY 4,676 0.64 1.40 0.01 18.77 
MB 3,963 4.83 114.42 -656.93 7,071.35 
PRICE 4,108 35.27 71.84 0.00 1,522.00 
RETURN 3,292 0.14 0.63 -0.94 4.16 
∆IBEI 3,234 56.19 1,487.24 -26,472.00 27,357.87 
∆NI 3,234 62.31 1,525.00 -26,213.00 27,357.87 
∆CFO 3,143 134.68 1,915.67 -44,739.00 36,706.00 
∆LOBBY 3,461 0.04 0.63 -7.55 11.39 
 
Panel B: All Compustat firms    
IBEI 53,685 108.10 924.44 -44,574.00 36,130.00 
NI 53,686 104.43 1,106.18 -98,696.00 36,130.00 
CFO 47,362 274.95 1,734.79 -48,073.47 102,999.81 
ASSET 53,806 6,771.52 50,490.00 0.00 1,588,784.81 
MB 45,685 3.55 169.50 -11,100.00 24,950.20 
PRICE 57,929 29.85 970.03 0.00 88,620.00 
RETURN 43,798 0.16 1.08 -0.98 9.00 
∆IBEI 43,256 14.33 755.40 -39,679.00 47,720.00 
∆NI 43,255 12.49 1,108.52 -93,775.00 101,335.00 
∆CFO 38,180 24.42 1,051.23 -69,093.23 47,370.00 
 
Variable definitions: 
 IBEI  = income before extraordinary items, in $millions; 
 NI  = net income, in $millions; 
 CFO = cash from operations, in $millions; 
 ASSET = total assets at the beginning of year t, in $millions; 
 LOBBY = annual lobbying spending, in $millions; 
 MB  = market-to-book ratio at the end of the year; 
 PRICE = share price at three months after the end of year t;  
 RETURN  = change of market value from three months after the end of year t-1 to three months after the end of 
year t, deflated by market value at three months after the end of year t-1;  
 ∆IBEI  = change in income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t; 
 ∆NI  = change in net income from year t-1 to year t; 
 ∆CFO = change in cash from operations from year t-1 to year t; 
 ∆LOBBY = change in lobbying expenditures from year t-1 to year t; 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES ibei ibei ibei ni ni ni cfo cfo cfo
lobbyt-1 88.437*** 75.368*** 79.636*** 59.430*** 69.887*** 69.708*** 48.207 50.144** 37.695
(4.066) (4.206) (3.663) (2.751) (3.952) (3.464) (1.601) (2.054) (1.307)
assets 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(4.863) (3.996) (8.934) (7.144) (6.469) (5.444) (4.481) (3.971) (2.785)
market-to-book ratio -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(-0.746) (0.065) (-0.711) (-0.990) (-0.825) (-1.037) (-0.040) (-0.066) (-1.308)
dependent variablet-1 0.270*** 0.256*** 0.224*** 0.188*** 0.295*** 0.266***
(9.982) (8.552) (8.710) (6.275) (9.830) (7.855)
dependent variablet-2 -0.094*** -0.044 0.023
(-2.692) (-1.569) (0.780)
Observations 36706 35739 29574 35899 34702 28489 31355 30391 25025
No. of firms 6986 6951 6598 6938 6874 6482 6136 6052 5703
R-squared (within) 0.085 0.154 0.174 0.0833 0.138 0.147 0.0979 0.181 0.149
R-squared (between) 0.311 0.541 0.423 0.223 0.452 0.430 0.201 0.575 0.695
R-squared (overall) 0.274 0.526 0.444 0.222 0.464 0.416 0.248 0.618 0.688
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between lobbying and firm performance. Firm performance is measured by: 
IBEI = income before extraordinary items in year t; NI = net income in year t; CFO = cash from operations in year t. Independent 
variables are: LOBBY = lobbying spending in year t-1; MB = market-to-book ratio at the end of year t; ASSET = total assets at the 
beginning of the year t. The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT files annually, for the years 1998-2005. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects, Fama-French industry 
dummies, and time dummies. Two-tailed t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the firm level) in the parenthesis under the coefficient 
estimates. *, **, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
Table V    Lobbying and Financial Performance
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES ∆ ibei ∆ ibei ∆ ibei ∆ ni ∆ ni ∆ ni ∆ cfo ∆ cfo ∆ cfo
lobbyt-1 35.614* 67.270** 44.417 53.207** 55.900** 39.885 -5.357 -19.858 28.541
(1.755) (2.456) (1.124) (2.393) (2.048) (1.566) (-0.255) (-0.606) (0.622)
assets 0.002* 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.002** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.005 0.015***
(1.843) (6.693) (7.290) (2.182) (5.200) (5.654) (2.107) (1.518) (4.654)
market-to-book ratio -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.360) (-0.231) (0.608) (-0.858) (-0.709) (-0.474) (-1.034) (-0.797) (-0.144)
dependent variablet-1 -0.348*** -0.445*** -0.408*** -0.508*** -0.401*** -0.526***
(-14.423) (-14.455) (-21.523) (-18.488) (-16.099) (-15.226)
dependent variablet-2 -0.299*** -0.289*** -0.298***
(-12.193) (-10.780) (-10.468)
Observations 35739 29574 23056 34702 28489 22040 30391 25025 19395
No. of firms 6951 6598 6023 6874 6482 5849 6052 5703 5160
R-squared (within) 0.015 0.137 0.220 0.0139 0.174 0.234 0.00297 0.148 0.227
R-squared (between) 0.0880 0.0686 0.0383 0.110 0.0389 0.0442 0.0964 0.0152 0.0307
R-squared (overall) 0.0300 0.0620 0.0603 0.0256 0.0726 0.0786 0.0157 0.0739 0.0679
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between lobbying and the change in firm performance. Firm performance is 
measured by: IBEI = income before extraordinary items in year t; NI = net income in year t; CFO = cash from operations in year t.  
Independent variables are: LOBBY = lobbying spending in year t-1; MB = market-to-book ratio at the end of year t; ASSET = total 
assets at the beginning of the year t. The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP 
and COMPUSTAT files annually, for the years 1998-2005. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects, Fama-French industry, 
and time dummies.  Two-tailed t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the firm level) in the parenthesis under the coefficient 
estimates. *, **, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table VI    Lobbying and Financial Performance: first difference specifications
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Table VII   Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Classified  
by Lobbying Expenditure Relative to Assets 
 
Rank 1(Low) 2 3 4 5(High) 
Non-
Lobbying 
Panel A: Returns before and after portfolio formation 
Average annual return over 3-year  
   period before portfolio formation 0.1681 0.1495 0.1798 0.2653 0.2353 0.2254 
First year after portfolio formation 0.1148 0.1601 0.1396 0.2088 0.3277 0.2970 
Second year after portfolio 
formation 0.1842 0.1612 0.2350 0.1703 0.2488 0.2480 
Third year after portfolio formation 0.1491 0.1923 0.1680 0.1714 0.2278 0.2419 
Average annual return over 3-year    
  period after portfolio formation 0.1494 0.1712 0.1809 0.1835 0.2681 0.2623 
Panel B: Excess returns before and after portfolio formation 
Average annual return over 3-year  
   period before portfolio formation -0.0381 -0.0761 -0.0588 -0.0071 -0.0514 0.0060 
First year after portfolio formation -0.0263 0.0160 -0.0112 0.0481 0.1083 -0.0035 
Second year after portfolio 
formation 0.0200 -0.0123 0.0641 0.0003 0.0230 -0.0025 
Third year after portfolio formation -0.0142 0.0215 -0.0031 0.0036 0.0349 -0.0011 
Average annual return over 3-year  
   period after portfolio formation -0.0068 0.0084 0.0166 0.0173 0.0554 -0.0024 
Panel C: Characteristics of Portfolios 
Average number of observations 485 491 490 491 488 18,834 
Lobby spending relative to assets 0.0006% 0.0025% 0.0067% 0.0149% 0.1151% 0% 
Lobby spending relative to sales 0.0023% 0.0049% 0.0160% 0.1305% 0.3712% 0% 
Lobby spending relative to market 
value 0.0021% 0.0052% 0.0111% 0.0223% 0.1021% 0% 
Book-to-market 0.5405 0.5363 0.5288 0.5020 0.4849 0.7120 
Sales-to-market 1.2345 1.4492 1.3465 1.2013 1.3486 1.9370 
Earnings-to-price -0.0070 0.0001 0.0076 0.0111 -0.0767 -0.0796 
Dividend yield 0.0200 0.0171 0.0177 0.0171 0.0083 0.0161 
Return on equity  0.0984 0.0957 0.2068 0.1316 0.0988 0.0868 
Log Assets 9.3298 8.5327 8.2146 7.9626 6.0142 5.5051 
The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and 
Compustat files. In Panel A, each portfolio's average annual buy-and-hold return is reported over the three 
years prior to portfolio formation; over each year from one to three years after portfolio formation; and 
averaged over the three years after portfolio formation. Panel B reports each portfolio's average return in 
excess of the equally weighted return on a control portfolio of stocks matched by firm size and book-to-
market in the first through third years. Panel C reports characteristics of the portfolios: the average number 
of component stocks; the ratios of lobbying expenditures to assets, to sales, and to market value of equity; 
book value of equity relative to market value of equity; sales relative to market value of equity; earnings 
relative to price; annual dividends divided by market value of equity; return on equity (earnings divided by 
the prior year's book value of equity); and the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars. 
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Table VIII   Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Classified  
by Lobbying Expenditure Relative to Market Value 
 
Rank 1(Low) 2 3 4 5(High) 
Non-
Lobbying 
Panel A: Returns before and after portfolio formation 
Average annual return over 3-year  
    period before portfolio formation 0.2578 0.2490 0.1815 0.1712 0.1391 0.2254 
First year after portfolio formation 0.0800 0.1255 0.1614 0.2249 0.3590 0.2970 
Second year after portfolio 
formation 0.1414 0.1594 0.1808 0.2150 0.3026 0.2480 
Third year after portfolio formation 0.1148 0.1479 0.1633 0.1981 0.2844 0.2419 
Average annual return over 3-year  
    period after portfolio formation 0.1120 0.1443 0.1685 0.2127 0.3153 0.2623 
Panel B: Excess returns before and after portfolio formation 
Average annual return over 3-year  
    period before portfolio formation -0.0199 -0.0191 -0.0723 -0.0558 -0.0643 0.0060 
First year after portfolio formation -0.0307 -0.0016 0.0268 0.0533 0.0870 -0.0035 
Second year after portfolio 
formation 0.0087 0.0082 0.0063 0.0187 0.0534 -0.0025 
Third year after portfolio formation -0.0262 -0.0094 0.0013 0.0153 0.0617 -0.0011 
Average annual return over 3-year  
    period after portfolio formation -0.0161 -0.0009 0.0114 0.0291 0.0674 -0.0024 
Panel C: Characteristics of Portfolios 
Average number of observations 485 491 490 491 488 18,834 
Lobby spending relative to assets 0.0016% 0.0051% 0.0097% 0.0197% 0.1035% 0% 
Lobby spending relative to sales 0.0037% 0.0139% 0.0635% 0.0804% 0.3613% 0% 
Lobby spending relative to market 
value 0.0008% 0.0030% 0.0072% 0.0175% 0.1144% 0% 
Book-to-market 0.3561 0.4007 0.4683 0.5867 0.7801 0.7120 
Sales-to-market 0.7443 0.9177 1.1169 1.5498 2.2504 1.9370 
Earnings-to-price 0.0280 -0.0026 0.0120 -0.0098 -0.0922 -0.0796 
Dividend yield 0.0146 0.0137 0.0167 0.0176 0.0174 0.0161 
Return on equity  0.1977 0.0978 0.1400 0.0588 0.1385 0.0868 
Log Assets 9.6101 8.9058 8.2617 7.5269 5.7513 5.5051 
 
The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and 
Compustat files. In Panel A, each portfolio's average annual buy-and-hold return is reported over the three 
years prior to portfolio formation; over each year from one to three years after portfolio formation; and 
averaged over the three years after portfolio formation. Panel B reports each portfolio's average return in 
excess of the equally weighted return on a control portfolio of stocks matched by firm size and book-to-
market in the first through third years. Panel C reports characteristics of the portfolios: the average number 
of component stocks; the ratios of lobbying expenditures to assets, to sales, and to market value of equity; 
book value of equity relative to market value of equity; sales relative to market value of equity; earnings 
relative to price; annual dividends divided by market value of equity; return on equity (earnings divided by 
the prior year's book value of equity); and the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars. 
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Table IX   Excess Returns of Portfolios Classified by Lobbying Expenditure  
Relative to Assets and by Past 3-year Return 
 
Ranked by 
  
Excess Return in Year  
after Portfolio Formation  Average Excess Return 
over 3 Post-formation 
Years 
Lobby spending  
relative to 
assets 
Past 3-year  
return   
First  
Year
Second 
Year
Third 
Year  
1(Low) 1(Low)  -0.0260 -0.0037 -0.0141  -0.0146 
 2(High)  -0.0265 0.0435 -0.0142  0.0009 
2 1  0.0063 0.0393 0.0276  0.0244 
 2  0.0257 -0.0632 0.0154  -0.0074 
3 1  -0.0100 0.0804 0.0002  0.0235 
 2  -0.0124 0.0482 -0.0064  0.0098 
4 1  0.0118 0.0004 -0.0086  0.0012 
 2  0.0840 0.0003 0.0155  0.0333 
5(High) 1(Low)  0.1155 -0.0081 0.0116  0.0397 
  2(High)   0.1012 0.0539 0.0581  0.0710 
 
The sample includes all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and 
Compustat files. All stocks with lobbying expenditures are ranked by lobbying expenditures 
relative to assets, and assigned to one of five equally sized portfolios. Within each of the five 
portfolios, stocks are further ranked by their rates of return over the prior three years and 
subdivided into two equally sized groups. The table reports each portfolio's average excess return 
over each of the first three years following portfolio formation and over all three years after 
portfolio formation. Excess returns are computed relative to a control portfolio of stocks based on 
size and book-to-market and then past three-year return. The excess return is the difference between 
the stock's annual buy-and-hold return and the return on the control portfolio.  
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Variables coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat
Intercept -0.0567 -107.35 *** -0.0531 -81.49 *** -0.0503 -56.58 ***
Lobby 0.0573 27.15 *** 0.0541 20.78 *** 0.0503 14.15 ***
Lobby*Post Citizens United -0.0040 -0.24 -0.0009 -0.05 0.0030 0.18
Post Citizens United 0.0071 1.66 * 0.0035 0.82 0.0007 0.17
n 426,225 275,583 144,259
R2 0.0017 0.0016 0.0014
Intercept -0.0567 -107.53 *** -0.0531 -81.58 *** -0.0503 -56.44 ***
Lobby 0.0573 27.19 *** 0.0541 20.8 *** 0.0503 14.11 ***
Lobby*Post Citizens United -0.0013 -0.18 0.0019 0.26 0.0057 0.75
Post Citizens United -0.0005 -0.27 -0.0041 -2.25 ** -0.0069 -3.63 ***
n 459,041 308,399 177,075
R2 0.0017 0.0016 0.0016
Intercept -0.0567 -107.37 *** -0.0531 -81.5 *** -0.0503 -56.58 ***
Lobby 0.0574 27.2 *** 0.0542 20.8 *** 0.0503 14.14 ***
Lobby*Post Citizens United -0.0035 -0.2 -0.0003 -0.02 0.0036 0.22
Post Citizens United 0.0071 1.66 * 0.0034 0.81 0.0007 0.16
n 426,225 275,583 144,259
R2 0.0018 0.0016 0.0014
Intercept -0.0567 -107.54 *** -0.0531 -81.58 *** -0.0503 -56.44 ***
Lobby 0.0574 27.24 *** 0.0542 20.82 *** 0.0503 14.11 ***
Lobby*Post Citizens United -0.0009 -0.13 0.0023 0.31 0.0062 0.81
Post Citizens United -0.0005 -0.28 -0.0041 -2.26 ** -0.0069 -3.64 ***
n 459,041 308,399 177,075
R2 0.0018 0.0016 0.0016
Panel D: 1-week subsequent to the announcememt date (Jan. 22, 2010)
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between stock market returns (the dependent variable) of firms that lobby relative 
to those with zero lobbying expenditures, pre- and post-Citizens United Supreme Court decision on January 21, 2010, using daily stock 
return data from the CRSP data base. "Lobby" is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm lobbied, and 0 if it did not. In 
Panel A and Panel B, the lobbying sample consists of firms with positive lobbying expenditures in 2009; in Panel C and Panel D, the 
lobbying sample consists of firms lobbying in three of the five years prior to 2010.   Post Citizens United is a dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 on January 22, 2010 and beyond, and the value 0 for days prior to January 21, 2010.  Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table X    Lobbying and Financial Performance
3-month window 2-month window 1-month window
Panel A: 1-day subsequent to the announcememt date (Jan. 22, 2010)
Panel B: 1-week subsequent to the announcememt date (Jan. 22, 2010)
Panel C: 1-day subsequent to the announcememt date (Jan. 22, 2010)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES ibei ibei ibei ni ni ni cfo cfo cfo
lobbyt-1 85.405*** 72.505*** 77.084*** 58.006*** 69.043*** 69.206*** 48.859 50.018** 36.335
(3.915) (4.052) (3.498) (2.694) (3.898) (3.414) (1.607) (2.042) (1.251)
assets 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(4.856) (3.969) (8.930) (7.107) (6.425) (5.421) (4.431) (3.931) (2.745)
market-to-book ratio -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(-0.598) (0.129) (-0.694) (-0.936) (-0.794) (-1.031) (0.007) (-0.092) (-1.354)
dependent variablet-1 0.273*** 0.257*** 0.229*** 0.191*** 0.304*** 0.278***
(9.938) (8.395) (8.827) (6.322) (10.238) (8.273)
dependent variablet-2 -0.096*** -0.042 0.029
(-2.691) (-1.497) (0.937)
Observations 35776 34822 28814 34986 33809 27754 30442 29497 24286
No. of firms 6806 6773 6425 6758 6697 6311 5957 5876 5533
R-squared (within) 0.084 0.155 0.173 0.0831 0.140 0.149 0.0991 0.186 0.157
R-squared (between) 0.315 0.547 0.423 0.224 0.456 0.433 0.201 0.584 0.709
R-squared (overall) 0.277 0.531 0.443 0.221 0.467 0.418 0.248 0.626 0.700
Appendix Table 1    Lobbying and Financial Performance 
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between lobbying and firm performance. The sample excludes firms in Banking and 
Finance. Firm performance is measured by: IBEI = income before extraordinary items in year t; NI = net income in year t; CFO = cash from 
operations in year t. Independent variables are: LOBBY = lobbying spending in year t-1; MB = market-to-book ratio at the end of year t; 
ASSET = total assets at the beginning of the year t. The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the 
CRSP and COMPUSTAT files annually, for the years 1998-2005. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects,  Fama-French industry,  
and time dummies. Two-tailed t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the firm level) in the parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. *, **, 
and *** indicate the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Appendix Table 2: Reverse Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES lobby lobby lobby 
        
assets 0.001* 0.001** 0.003 
(1.860) (1.983) (1.442) 
market-to-book ratio 0.001 0.002 0.001 
(0.729) (0.804) (0.316) 
IBEIt-1 0.016 
(0.962) 
NIt-1 -0.016 
(-0.987) 
CFOt-1 0.002 
(1.041) 
Observations 36161 35432 30993 
No. of firms 6976 6943 6133 
R-squared (within) 0.203 0.288 0.275 
R-squared (between) 0.113 0.147 0.0520 
R-squared (overall) 0.114 0.108 0.0448 
This table reports OLS estimates of the "reverse" regressions: i.e., between lobbying and 
lagged firm performance. Dependent variable is lobbying spending in year t. Independent 
variables are: IBEI = income before extraordinary items in year t-1; NI = net income in year 
t-1; CFO = cash from operations in year t-1; Market-to-book ratio = market-to-book ratio at 
the end of year t; ASSETS = total assets at the beginning of the year t. The sample includes 
all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT files annually, for the years 1998-2005. All regressions include Fama-French 
industry dummies and time dummies. Two-tailed t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the 
firm level) in the parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate the 
regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. All coefficients have been multiplied by 1000. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES ibei ibei ibei ni ni ni cfo cfo cfo
lobbyt 74.424*** 71.968*** 60.991** 40.874*** 27.376** 25.897* 71.811*** 49.964** 44.775
(3.082) (3.905) (2.456) (2.756) (2.022) (1.744) (3.785) (2.248) (1.601)
assets 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(5.045) (3.993) (8.926) (6.424) (6.585) (5.439) (4.616) (3.986) (2.798)
market-to-book ratio -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(-0.856) (-0.021) (-0.802) (-0.988) (-0.820) (-1.023) (-0.457) (-0.147) (-1.633)
dependent variablet-1 0.273*** 0.259*** 0.226*** 0.192*** 0.295*** 0.266***
(10.071) (8.626) (8.802) (6.380) (9.836) (7.835)
dependent variablet-2 -0.095*** -0.045 0.024
(-2.721) (-1.591) (0.801)
Observations 41621 35739 29574 40752 34702 28489 35619 30391 25025
No. of firms 7099 6951 6598 7058 6874 6482 6247 6052 5703
R-squared (within) 0.079 0.154 0.172 0.0771 0.134 0.143 0.117 0.181 0.149
R-squared (between) 0.325 0.544 0.419 0.227 0.438 0.420 0.201 0.575 0.695
R-squared (overall) 0.279 0.528 0.439 0.226 0.455 0.408 0.254 0.618 0.688
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between lobbying and firm performance. Firm performance is measured 
by: IBEI = income before extraordinary items in year t; NI = net income in year t; CFO = cash from operations in year t. 
Independent variables are: LOBBY = lobbying spending in year t; MB = market-to-book ratio at the end of year t; ASSET = 
total assets at the beginning of the year t. The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage 
on the CRSP and COMPUSTAT files annually, for the years 1998-2005. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects, 
Fama-French industry, and time dummies. Two-tailed t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the firm level) in the parenthesis 
under the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Appendix Table 3    Lobbying and Financial Performance: Contemporaneous Lobbying
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES ibei ibei ibei ni ni ni cfo cfo cfo
Σ lobby (t, t-1) 134.43*** 104.1*** 91.57*** 67.07*** 65.65*** 67.51*** 83.02*** 69.45** 58.91
(4.593) (4.157) (3.690) (3.223) (3.920) (3.252) (2.704) (2.364) (1.601)
assets 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(4.848) (3.969) (8.926) (7.148) (6.547) (5.452) (4.487) (3.973) (2.798)
market-to-book ratio -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(-0.850) (0.009) (-0.753) (-0.991) (-0.823) (-1.035) (-0.166) (-0.103) (-1.508)
dependent variablet-1 0.270*** 0.257*** 0.224*** 0.188*** 0.294*** 0.265***
(9.994) (8.552) (8.697) (6.265) (9.839) (7.851)
dependent variablet-2 -0.094*** -0.043 0.023
(-2.698) (-1.561) (0.768)
Observations 36706 35739 29574 35899 34702 28489 31355 30391 25025
No. of firms 6986 6951 6598 6938 6874 6482 6136 6052 5703
R-squared (within) 0.0892 0.156 0.175 0.0835 0.138 0.147 0.101 0.181 0.150
R-squared (between) 0.332 0.552 0.427 0.226 0.450 0.429 0.207 0.577 0.696
R-squared (overall) 0.292 0.534 0.447 0.224 0.463 0.415 0.256 0.619 0.687
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between lobbying and firm performance. Firm performance is measured by: 
IBEI = income before extraordinary items in year t; NI = net income in year t; CFO = cash from operations in year t. Independent 
variables are: LOBBY = lobbying spending in years t and t-1; MB = market-to-book ratio at the end of year t; ASSET = total assets 
at the beginning of the year t. The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT files annually, for the years 1998-2005. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects, Fama-French industry, and 
time dummies. Two-tailed t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the firm level) in the parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. *, 
**, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix Table 4    Lobbying and Financial Performance: (Current and One period Lag of Lobbying)
40 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES ibei ibei ibei ni ni ni cfo cfo cfo
Σ lobby (t, t-1, t-2) 176.28*** 154.4*** 141.2*** 108.7*** 107.8*** 108.8*** 83.02* 69.45 58.91
(4.007) (4.110) (4.025) (3.515) (3.584) (3.971) (1.853) (1.341) (1.256)
assets 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.016***
(4.936) (4.421) (8.875) (6.492) (6.034) (5.468) (3.229) (2.983) (2.799)
market-to-book ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.608) (-0.544) (-0.819) (-0.880) (-0.939) (-1.044) (-1.113) (-1.314) (-1.510)
dependent variablet-1 0.225*** 0.254*** 0.179*** 0.183*** 0.254*** 0.265***
(8.088) (8.467) (6.463) (6.138) (7.763) (7.853)
dependent variablet-2 -0.096*** -0.045 0.023
(-2.774) (-1.605) (0.761)
Observations 31094 30532 29574 30370 29596 28489 26502 25900 25025
No. of firms 6758 6720 6598 6700 6626 6482 5905 5828 5703
R-squared (within) 0.0959 0.149 0.178 0.0906 0.134 0.150 0.0749 0.135 0.150
R-squared (between) 0.322 0.483 0.438 0.231 0.384 0.434 0.232 0.568 0.696
R-squared (overall) 0.288 0.481 0.455 0.219 0.409 0.418 0.287 0.611 0.687
Appendix Table 5    Lobbying and Financial Performance: (Current and Two Lags of Lobbying)
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between lobbying and firm performance. Firm performance is measured by: 
IBEI = income before extraordinary items in year t; NI = net income in year t; CFO = cash from operations in year t. Independent 
variables are: LOBBY = lobbying spending in years t, t-1, and t-2; MB = market-to-book ratio at the end of year t; ASSET = total 
assets at the beginning of the year t. The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the 
CRSP and COMPUSTAT files annually, for the years 1998-2005. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects, Fama-French 
industry, and time dummies. Two-tailed t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the firm level) in the parenthesis under the coefficient 
estimates. *, **, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES ibei ibei ibei ni ni ni cfo cfo cfo
lobbyt-1 78.585*** 66.939*** 87.860*** 31.567 45.194** 57.404** 39.707 94.643** 62.157
(2.868) (2.890) (4.036) (1.159) (2.012) (2.048) (0.888) (2.466) (1.363)
assets 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.012*
(4.106) (2.941) (7.254) (5.938) (5.602) (4.096) (3.217) (2.734) (1.864)
market-to-book ratio -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001*
(-0.425) (0.474) (-0.274) (-0.184) (0.367) (-0.089) (-0.236) (0.002) (-1.721)
dependent variablet-1 0.219*** 0.185*** 0.207*** 0.150*** 0.314*** 0.292***
(6.954) (5.140) (6.417) (3.915) (7.994) (6.642)
dependent variablet-2 -0.126*** -0.062* 0.041
(-2.713) (-1.903) (1.134)
Observations 33034 32178 26286 32431 31392 25494 27970 27124 22021
No. of firms 6621 6586 6169 6571 6509 6056 5783 5705 5282
R-squared (within) 0.073 0.117 0.154 0.0671 0.120 0.122 0.0820 0.168 0.146
R-squared (between) 0.324 0.513 0.339 0.215 0.418 0.388 0.193 0.617 0.735
R-squared (overall) 0.281 0.493 0.360 0.208 0.438 0.372 0.215 0.635 0.725
Appendix Table 6    Lobbying and Financial Performance: (Largest Lobbying Spenders)
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between lobbying and firm performance; it excludes firms with nonzero 
lobbying expenditures less than the top quartile. Firm performance is measured by: IBEI = income before extraordinary items in 
year t; NI = net income in year t; CFO = cash from operations in year t. Independent variables are: LOBBY = lobbying spending in 
year t-1; MB = market-to-book ratio at the end of year t; ASSET = total assets at the beginning of the year t. The sample includes 
all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and COMPUSTAT files annually, for the years 1998-
2005. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects, Fama-French industry, and time dummies. Two-tailed t-statistics (adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level) in the parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
